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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
lent to the value of the object (a refrigerator) at the time of
the wrongful repossession, together with additional damages
of approximately the same amount. Now that the chattel mort-
gage has become such a pervasive and widely used security
device, and since so much has been done to protect the interest
of the creditor, it is not out of place to protect the rights of
the debtor as well.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
This resum6 of the year's work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in the subjects named in the above title is the sixteenth
prepared by the writer. It can scarcely be presumptuous or
amiss to observe that no previous year is marked by as many
cases of truly new impression, or of as grave importance in the
development of the law of the state. Moreover, a clearness of
factual statement, a completeness of analysis, an intellectual
satisfaction to be derived from the logic of deduction whether
in agreement or otherwise, characterizes the work as a whole
in a manner not hitherto observed in the humble judgment of
this reader. Particularly is this true in mineral rights where
almost every case is a tempting invitation for a thesis. It causes
the writer keen disappointment and some sense of frustration
that the space, nature and purpose of this yearly article neces-
sitate the type of brief treatment given. The civil law lends
itself to a moulding by the court for the best interests of the
people, as the time, the place and the social and economic con-
ditions dictate, and encourage creative jurisprudence of the
highest type. It would appear that the Louisiana Supreme
Court has assumed this proper responsibility as a high privi-
lege and a solemn duty of office.
SUCCESSIONS
Regular Heirs
In Bishop v. Copeland1 surviving half-brothers and sisters
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 284, 62 So. 2d 486 (1952).
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were permitted to claim their three-fourths interest in the de-
ceased's half-sister's succession, although her father had been
put into possession of the whole and had mortgaged it to the
defendant's predecessor in title who had obtained it under fore-
closure of a mortgage. The court stated that the registry pro-
visions2 do not apply when the immovable has bested by "mere
operation of law."'3 The principle emphasized throughout the
Civil Code that in case of regular heirs, property vests imme-
diately upon death of the one from whom the inheritance was
received, was cited as clearly applicable, and under that theory
no interruption occurs regardless of possession. Strong and
heartening statements were made obviously in line with the
articles of the code dealing with regular heirs. The "suspen-
sion" idea, sometimes advanced, seemed to have been at vari-
ance with the doctrine and might lead to confusion. The clear
expressions dealing with vesting of property by "operation of
law" as related to the laws of registry strengthen and protect
Louisiana's basic laws on forced heirship and community prop-
erty as well as those dealing with regular heirs. Several trouble-
some questions may be clarified by the logical analysis of this
case.5
Collation
After a succession has been closed, collation may not be
required. It is made only to the succession of the donor.' In
Himel v. Connely7 an executor was held to have no accounting
to make as no funds were in his hands according to declara-
tions of all heirs when asking for the succession to be closed
and executor discharged. They may not later deny these alle-
gations.8
The price 9 paid by a daughter to her father for a piece of
property in Taylor v. Brown1° was proved to have been more
than one-fourth of its value at the time of the sale, and hence
not a donation in disguise. The father's succession had not been
2. Arts. 2251-2266, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Arts. 940-942, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. See Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103, 52 So. 2d 437 (1951).
5. See Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
6. Art. 1242, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. 221 La. 1073, 61 So. 2d 876 (1952).
8. Art. 1194, La. Civil Code of 1870; Art. 1003, La. Code of Practice of
1870.
9. Art. 2444, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. 66 So. 2d 578 (La. 1953).
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opened and hence claims for collation of this "advantage":"
could not be considered because collation can only be made to
the succession. 12
Administration
In Succession of Baronet, Opposition of Aub61 no fraud,
collusion or mismanagement by the administrator having been
proved, a failure to file a tableau of proposed expenditures, and
gain its approval before payment was made, was found not to
be such an irregularity as to warrant the application of statutory
penalties.'14 Sound discretion of the court is to be exercised in
applying these penalties. Honest errors of judgment do not war-
rant such punishment.
The well-established rule that appointment of an adminis-
trator is within the sound discretion of the judge was again
emphasized in Succession of Perot.15 Thus, a brother of deceased
who claimed to be a creditor was maintained in office. Here
proof was found insufficient to deny his commission on grounds
of negligence or wrong doing.
An order to sell succession property in Hicks v. Hughes4
signed by a clerk of court was said to be an absolute nullity
when the application by the administrator was found to have
been unaccompanied by a statement of the debts as directed
by law.' 7 Powers of this nature given to a clerk are extraordi-
nary and must be exercised only within the strict interpreta-
tion of the statute.1 8 Cases holding that omissions of similar
nature were but informalities cured by prescription of five years
were distinguished as they dealt with orders signed by the judge
or under statute giving the clerk jurisdiction because of absence
of the judge.
A "reasonable" amount under all of the circumstances was
awarded in Succession of Twohey"9 on quantum meruit from
the succession for personal care and food for the deceased.
11. Art. 1248, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Art. 1242, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. 222 La. 1051, 64 So. 2d 428 (1953).
14. Art. 1150, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. 223 La. 412, 65 So. 2d 895 (1953).
16. 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953).
17. La. Act 204 of 1924.
18. Art. 3543, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. 222 La. 697, 63 So. 2d 429 (1953).
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DONATIONS
Inter Vivos
A situation was involved in Stipe v. Simon,20 where a
daughter of deceased sued for recovery of a piece of property
sold by her father to his sister. She was successful since her
aunt was unable to sustain the burden of proof necessary under
presumption of simulation established by facts that the trans-
action was other than a donation in disguise.2 1 This being a
donation, it was null as donor had reserved usufruct for him-
self.2
2
In Sanders v. Sander 23 the court maintained that a col-
lateral heir as the "representative 24 of the deceased could
attack a contract of the deceased on the ground that a fraud
had been committed against the dead person. It was stated
that all heirs must join to set aside on the ground of lesion;2 5
that a collateral may not attack by parole evidence a deed on
the ground of simulation, a donation in disguise; 2 and that
collateral heirs may not attack on the ground that the deceased
gave away all of his property.
27
In Succession of Gilbert2 the provision that a remunera-
tive donation is not a real donation if the value of the services
in money is but slightly less than the value of the gift was
invoked and in State ex rel. Bunkie Coca Cola Bottling Co.2 0
that ratification of a donation precludes complaint.31
The court declared in Holloway v. Holloway32 that while
one co-owner purchasing at a tax sale causes the title to inure to
the benefit of all, the doctrine even if the facts fitted, and appar-
ently they did not, was not applicable when the benefits were
never asserted nor the duties fulfilled for more than thirty years.
20. 66 So. 2d 330 (La. 1953).
21. Art. 2444, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Art. 1533, La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. 222 La. 233, 62 So. 2d 284 (1952).
24. Art. 1881, La. Civil Code of 1870.
25. Wolfson v. Lisso's Succession, 207 La. 67, 20 So. 2d 427 (1944).
26. Art. 2444, La. Civil Code of 1870.
27. Art. 1497, La. Civil Code of 1870.
28. 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953).
29. Arts. 1513 and 1525, La. Civil Code of 1870.
30. 222 La. 603, 63 So. 2d 13 (1953).
31. Art. 2274, La. Civil Code of 1870.
32. 221 La. 875, 60 So. 2d 468 (1952).
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Satisfactory proof, adduced to show a gift inter vivos of
cattle by a father to his son in Elder v. Elder,33 obviously pre-
cluded the father from claiming a community share of the ani-
mals after a divorce from his wife.
Mortis Causa
Form. Quite a number of cases appeared during the year
dealing with the form of wills. One instance was an attack in
Successions of Gilbert34 on the ground that the will, nuncupa-
tive by public act, had not been written as dictated by the
notary. It was shown that the exact words of the testator were
not used. The court relying upon previous expressions by the
justices applied the test that "it is identity of thoughts and
not of words which the law requires. 18 5 The will was upheld.
In a second case in which the point was raised, Cormier v.
Myers,8 6 the will was shown not to have been really dictated.
Words put into the mouth of the testatrix by an expectant bene-
ficiary were merely approved and followed.
In Succession of Muntz37 proof was adduced to show that
additions to what appeared to be the beginning of an olographic
testament by the deceased had been made in a hand other than
that of the testator.8   The will obviously fell. Since the date
was superimposed in another hand, invalidity followed on a
second ground, uncertainty of the date. 9 These two grounds of
invalidity also defeated another testament in Succession of Sar-
razin.4 0  A will was found "written by an illiterate person on
both sides of a very small piece of ragged paper"41 upon which
appeared June 1944. The first numeral seemed to have been a
light stroke retraced by a heavy one. Proponents urged that
testatrix had put in the heavy stroke herself to indicate 1st
of June. Whether she did or not was "uncertain" and thus the
will fell because of doubt of the handwriting and for lack of
a certain date.
Perhaps the most interesting case dealing with the form
33. 66 So. 2d 1 (La. 1953).
34. 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953).
35. Art. 1578, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Rostrup v. Succession of Spicer,
193 La. 1087, 165 So. 307, 308 (1936).
36. 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
37. 222 La. 689, 63 So. 2d 426 (1953).
38. Art. 1588, La. Civil Code of 1870.
39. See Succession of Buck, 208 La. 556, 23 So. 2d 215 (1945).
40. 223 La. 286, 65 So. 2d 602 (1953).
41. Ibid.
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of wills was Love v. Dawkins42 which had to do with a new
situation regarding certainty of date. The instrument at the top
left hand corner showed August 31, 1946, then appeared the word
"will," and at the bottom of the paper a statement that the testa-
ment had been entirely written, dated, and signed in her own
hand. This was said to have been done on the 30th day of
August, 1946. The court noted that previous decisions had made
it clear that the place of the date is immaterial. The French
commentators were cited for statements approving more than
one date made in sequence, the reasoning being that the tes-
tator might have taken several days to complete the writing
of the document. The argument in this case was that the dates
were not in sequence, the later date appearing first. The court
took the position, however, that the testatrix might have in-
serted the later date at the top merely reaffirming her dispo-
sition that she had solemnly declared to have been made in
her own handwriting on the earlier date and thus the will was
upheld.
United States Bonds. Relying heavily upon previous ex-
pressions of the court,4" claim was made in State v. Culpepper44
that in purchase of co-owner bonds by a wife with community
funds in her name and that of her husband, she had made a
donation mortis causa to her husband, which prevented her
legatees under her will from recovering one-half of the value
of the bonds. Title had been vested in the husband upon the
wife's death and upon the husband's death in his heirs under
federal regulations governing the bond issue. The court dis-
tinguished beneficiary bonds from co-owner bonds but noted
that while title must vest under federal law, even in beneficiary
bonds the claim of the widow for her half of the community
in value had been protected. In a previous co-owner bond case 45
the right of a forced heir to claim his legitime and to demand
collation had been protected. Thus, while in a sense and as to
title under the contract with the United States the bond device
may seem to have the result of a will, the laws of the state may
not be negated. The court made the following forceful state-
ment in the instant case: "Any other conclusion, obviously,
would greatly endanger the recognized right of the wife to
42. 222 La. 259, 62 So. 2d 399 (1952).
43. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
44. 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).
45. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
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make disposition by testament of her vested one-half interest
in the community property. Thus, a husband could invest the
community funds or property in United States savings bonds
of the co-ownership type and, on outliving his wife, would
become the sole owner of her interest, subject only to the legal
rights of forced heirs if there be any."46
Capacity. In Cormier v. Myers47 lack of mental capacity
of the maker at the time of confection of a will was the basic
reason for failure of a testament previously referred to in the
discussion regarding form. An aged person in an advanced
stage of senility was put through a farcical situation purporting
to produce a valid nuncupative will by public act. The affair
was staged by the keeper of the nursing home in which the
aged testatrix was lodged. The testament doubtless could not
have been declared invalid without full proof of mental inca-
pacity and the closely allied defect in form as "undue influence"4 8
is not allowed as a cause of nullity under the Louisiana law.
However, the court impressively and pertinently stated that
while a nursing home manager is not included in the prohi-
bition49 against receipt of gifts by doctors and clergymen attend-
ing a person during the last illness the "spirit" of this policy
is definitely present.50
Another case dealing with the lack of capacity, Succession
of Washington,51 appeared during the year. A negress, with the
assistance of a white man, operated a house of prostitution.
Upon her death, the woman left to her associate a piece of
immovable property. Proof of a convincing nature, not mere
rumor, established that the two had been living in "open" con-
cubinage.52 Whether or not they occupied separate rooms was
considered relatively immaterial.5 3 The legacy was not allowed,
thus "giving effect to the purpose of the law of maintaining
good morals and public order and preserving the best interests
of society without prying into the innermost secrets and pri-
vate life of the deceased.
'54
46. 222 La. 962, 971, 64 So. 2d 234, 237 (1953).
47. 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
48. Art. 1492, La. Civil Code of 1870.
49. Art. 1489, La. Civil Code of 1870.
50. 65 So. 2d 345, 350 (La. 1953).
51. 222 La. 707, 63 So. 2d 610 (1953).
52. Art. 1481, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. See Text of Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456, 38 So. 417 (1905).
54. 222 La. 707, 712, 63 So. 2d 610, 611 (1953).
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Revocation. In a most interesting case, Smith v. Shaw,"
the court positively affirmed the proposition that intentional
destruction of a testament by mutilation is a revocation. The
article dealing with the matter uses the word "act,"56 apparently
indicating an instrument of sale or other formal paper rather
than an action resulting in destruction. However, the court
following expressions in previous opinions felt that intentional
destruction had always been recognized as a means of revoca-
tion, and made it doubly clear in this decision that this method,
whether mentioned in the code or not, was a most effective
way of revoking. The testatrix had made an olographic will
apparently valid but upon the advice of an attorney she then
made a nuncupative will by public act. Then upon the advice
of a second attorney she made a second will nuncupative by
public act which was declared null after her death. The first
two wills were destroyed at her request and thus she died
intestate. The attempt was made to establish the first will and
it was shown that the intention of the testatrix was clear since
she had made the same bequests in all three of the papers to
relatives of her deceased husband. A doctrine of "dependent
relatives" said to obtain in England, Canada, and certain states
of the United States, was unsuccessfully argued. This theory
.was that in such situations a previous will could only be in-
voked by a later valid instrument.
Prescription. In the case of In re Andrus50 the time at which
prescription5 8 begins to run against the right to bring action
to declare a will null was held to be the date of filing for pro-
bate. Since the will in question had never been probated, the
article was applied and thus a child and children of a pre-
deceased child were able to urge reduction and collation. The
well-known principle that a will is not invalid but merely re-
ducible by virtue of containing bequests exceeding the dis-
posable portion was reiterated.59 Moreover, it was again stated
that no absolute prescriptive0 period is provided for collation
which is possible until the succession has been settled and the
heirs placed in possession.
55. 221 La. 896, 60 So. 2d 865 (1952).
56. Art. 1691, La. Civil Code of 1870.
57. 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952).
58. Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870.
59. Art. 1502, La. Civil Code of 1870.
60. Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870, does not apply.
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Interpretation. The court again ruled in Succession of Rou-
gon 1 that a prohibited substitution 2 is an attempt to hold inalien-
able title in a donee for the latter's lifetime with necessity of
transfer at death to another named person. Thus the donor
would in effect be giving away the thing twice or substituting
his disposition for that of the law imposed upon the first donee.
A fidei commissum was again ruled in distinction to be a place-
ment of title in the immediate donee with a charge to convey
it to another person. Title having vested, the charge might be
regarded as not written in a legal sense, being merely preca-
tory and binding on the conscience only, of the donee.
The following bequests were held to belong in the substi-
tution category and hence, null in their entirety with no vest-
ing in the first named donee:
"The share of Mrs. Nadege Rougon Lorio is not to be
disposed and at her death my wish is that my niece Mrs.
Audrey Lorio Ritter receives it.
"I desire the share Mrs. Nellie Rougon Decuir receives
be divided at her death between my two nephews Thomas
Gordon Neff and Edward Ray Neff."
The first bequest read as follows and the sister not given
an inalienable title received her third:
"The rest of the property and money be divided among
my sisters, Mrs. Alice Rougon Neff, Mrs. Nellie Rougon
Decuir, and Mrs. Nadege Rougon Lorio."' 3
The court found the bequest non-conjoint as the testator
was thought to have assigned parts, hence there was no ac-
cretion and the lapsed legacies were distributed to the legal
heirs.64
Adoption. Proof that one adopted child had received his
legitime, as recited in the olographic will of the deceased parent
by adoption was found unsatisfactory by the court in Succession
of Thomson.6 5 Another adopted child was successful in re-
ducing the amount left to the universal legatee by the amount
of her forced portion, one-fourth of the estate. The two adopted
61. 223 La. 103, 65 So. 2d 104 (1953).
62. Art. 1520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
63. Ibid.
64. Succession of Rougon, 223 La. 103, 65 So. 2d 104 (1953).
65. 221 La. 791, 60 So. 2d 411 (1952).
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children were given the same rights as would have accrued
to legitimate children. The constitutiorial provision was cited.66
A donation to one adopted person was said to have been revoked
by the fact that donor and donee joined in a sale to a third
person. One justice dissented on this point for the sound reasons
stated in his previous dissenting opinion. 7 A purported revo-
cation of the adoption of this major was not honored, as there
is no law providing for change of this status protected by the
constitutional provision previously cited.
"Notarial act" as used in the statute providing for adop-
tion of majors was found not to be synonymous with authentic
act or private act duly acknowledged since a status and not a
contract was involved. It might be thought that more rather
than less formality should be necessary in creating the status
of a forced heir protected by the highest law of the state and
imbedded in the very fabric of the code.
These majors themselves decided that the relationship "did
not work" and attempted to disavow the artificial relationship.
The case as a whole while certainly correct under the law
as written strengthens the writer's opinion that adoption of
majors should be abolished. No safeguards whatever surround
the act for protection of existing forced heirs against a malicious,
angry, immoral or emotionally disturbed parent or child. When
honest and affectionate motives are present, the disposable
portion is available for gift, the name may be changed, the
same or greater protection may be given as that furnished by
adoption, which may easily be used for purely venal or vin-
dictive purposes. The present adoption act for minors furnishes
protection for both parties when this important "status" is to
be created.
Executor. An executrix sued as such, in Succession of Quag-
lino, 8 seven years after her discharge to claim for the original
succession a piece of property said to have been illegally trans-
ferred by the deceased. The court found that the succession
having been formally closed and the executrix discharged, that
judgment barred this proceeding or any other of a mortuary
nature until set aside and the succession reopened.
66. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16. See La. Act 318 of 1944.
67. Atkins v. Johnston, 213 La. 458, 35 So. 2d 16 (1948).
68. 223 La. 171, 65 So. 2d 127 (1953).
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COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Succession of Fields6 9 upon a husband's death his widow
was put into possession of one-half of the community property
as of right, one-half as heir. 0 Later another "widow" of his
first undissolved marriage, with two children, appeared to set
aside the first ex parte judgment. The second "widow" was
found to have been in good faith, so she received one-half and
the widow of the first marriage got one-half. The children
received nothing as their bigamist father had no share.7 1 Insur-
ance had been paid to the putative "widow." A quasi contrac-
tual relationship 72 was said to have arisen and the putative
wife must pay the legal wife one-half. No necessity was said
to exist to sue the insurance company or make it a party.
This rule of thumb from the Spanish law, while apparently
settled by the relatively few cases when it has been applicable
seems of doubtful equity to the living and certainly no punish-
ment to the dead. The putative wife gets more than a legally
married second wife would receive since the husband's share
of the first community if preserved as such would be separate
property as to the second wife and would be shared by the
children. To punish a dead bigamist by preventing his children
from receiving even a forced share safeguarded by code and
Constitution while rewarding the innocent but careless or stupid
adult for her "faith" appears rather illogical.
In Leager v. Leager73 the court was forced to restate the
well-known rule that the community continues until legally
terminated and its debts must be paid. Thus a husband could
not obtain a credit for funds so expended during the period of
physical separation from his wife preceding suit for judicial
separation. After court order for partition of property the
judge shall refer to the recorder or to a notary the task of con-
cluding the matter as directed.74
69. 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952).
70. Art. 915, La. Civil Code of 1870.
71. Art. 117, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Ray v. Knox, 164 La. 193, 113
So. 814 (1927), citing Patton v. Philadelphia, I La. Ann. 98 (1846).
72. Arts. 2293, 2294, La. Civil Code of 1870.
73. 222 La. 301, 62 So. 2d 492 (1952), 222 La. 309, 62 So. 2d 494 (1952).
74. Art. 1345, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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